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Liability of Liquor Vendors
To Third Party Victims
Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496,
244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1959 a third party victim's only recourse against a
liquor vendor was through dram shop and civil damage acts. These
acts impose liability upon liquor vendors for injuries caused by the
sale of alcoholic beverages to certain statutorily proscribed per-
sons.' Under the traditional common law, a cause of action against
a liquor vendor was virtually unknown.2  The basis for refusing
to impose such liability usually rested on the theory that it was
the consumption of the liquor, not the sale, which was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.3 Other courts refused recovery on the
1. Sixteen states currently have dram shop or civil damage acts in force:
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 120 (1958 & Supp. § 121 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-102 (West Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE tit. 4, § 713 (1974); ILL.
ANN. STAT., ch. 43, §§ 135-136 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 123.49 (West Supp. 1977-1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 17,
§ 2002 (1964); Mcn. COmp. LAws § 436.22 (Supp. 1977-1978); MIN.
STAT. Atm. § 340.95 (West 1972); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (1975); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 3-11-1-2 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. STAT. § 12-34 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
The history of Nebraska dram shop acts is set out in Holmes v.
Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 498-99, 244 N.W.2d 64, 67 (1976). Various versions
of the dram shop act were in effect in Nebraska from 1881 to 1935. Id.
For cases decided under the Nebraska dram shop acts, see Kraus
v. Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809, 182 N.W. 364 (1921); Hauth v. Sambo, 100
Neb. 160, 158 N.W. 1036 (1916); Forrest v. Koehn, 99 Neb. 441, 156
N.W. 1046 (1916); Buckmaster v. McElroy, 20 Neb. 557, 31 N.W. 76
(1886). For a general discussion of dram shop and civil damage acts
see Comment, 57 CALaF. L. REv. 995 (1969); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 923
(1959).
2. Buntin v. Hutton, 206 IMI. App. 194, 199 (1917); Demge v. Feierstein,
222 Wis. 199, 203, 268 N.W. 210, 212 (1936).
3. "[T]here may be a sale without intoxication, but no intoxication with-
out drinking." Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 290, 162 P.2d 125, 127
(1945). See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1957).
952 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 4 (1977)
basis of contributory negligence, 4 the rationale being that it was
not a tort to sell or give away intoxicating liquor to one who was
strong and able-bodied.5 Still other courts held that civil damage
acts had preempted the field of civil liability.8 The courts have
recognized only a very few exceptions.
7
In 1959, the landmark case of Rappaport v. Nichols8 was decided
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Rappaport began a trend of
decisions which recognized a common law cause of action against
liquor vendors who sold alcoholic beverages in violation of criminal
statutes. This view has now been adopted in fifteen states and the
District of Columbia, 9 while in three additional states it has been
4. James v. Wicker, 309 Ill. App. 397, 402, 33 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1941); An-
slinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 534, 298 A.2d 84,
88 (1972).
5. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (Qth Cir. 1965); James v.
Wicker, 309 Ill. App. 397, 402, 33 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1941); Cruse v. Aden,
127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889).
6. Farmer's Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 350, 117
N.W.2d 347, 350 (1962).
7. "A man who, in violation of law makes another helplessly drunk, and
then places him in a situation where his drunken condition is likely
to bring harm to himself or injury to others, may well be deemed
guilty of an actionable wrong independently of any statute." Dunlap
v. Wagner, 85 Ind. 529, 530 (1882)- See also Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz.
535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940) (wife allowed to maintain action against a
liquor vendor who sold liquor to her spouse knowing of his lack of
control over consumption of liquor); Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440
(1850) (master able to bring action against vendor who sold liquor
to his slave without the master's consent); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D.
161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940) (wife allowed to recover where she had
warned the liquor vendor on repeated occasions not to furnish alco-
holic beverages to her husband); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883)
(recovery allowed where the court found that there was a complete
and wanton disregard for the welfare of the decedent at a time when
he was in no condition to observe ordinary care for self-preservation).
8. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). Rappaport allowed recovery of dam-
ages in an action against a tavern keeper who sold alcoholic beverages
to minors. After the sale the minors became involved in an automo-
bile accident with the plaintiff.
9. Marusa v. Dist. of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Vance v.
United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973); Deeds v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d
153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971); Prevatt v. McClennan, 201
So. 2d 780 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App.
2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d
847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Adamian v.
Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Thaut v. Finley,
50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn.
101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d
900 (1965); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959);
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recognized as sound.10 The Nebraska Supreme Court, in Holmes
v. Circo," rejected this line of decisions. This note will analyze
the court's reasoning and the reasoning which supports the trend
toward establishing liability against liquor vendors.
LI. THE DECISION
The plaintiff in Holmes brought an action to recover for injuries
she sustained when the automobile in which she was a passenger
collided with an automobile driven by George Archer. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants, Louis S. Circo, owner of Circo's Bar,
and his employee, Theresa Jones, had served alcoholic beverages
to Archer on the day of the collision knowing that he was intoxi-
cated and knowing that he had at his disposal an automobile which
he intended to drive. The plaintiff contended that such actions on
the part of defendants constituted negligence and a violation of sec-
tion 53-180 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.12 These actions were
alleged to be the proximate cause of her injuries.1 3 The Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that the plain-
tiff's petition failed to state a cause of action. The court found that
the statute did not create a civil remedy nor impose a duty on the
Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965); Majors
v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965); Mitchell v. Ketner,
54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964).
Contra, Pierce v. Lopez, 16 Ariz. App. 54, 490 P.2d 1182 (1971); Carr
v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo.
425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d
54 (1969); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966);
Haim v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969);
Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Farmer's Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347 (1962);
Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
10. Moore v. Riley, 487 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1972); Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18
(1971); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 541 P.2d 365 (1975).
11. 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 64 (1976).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (Reissue 1974) reads as follows:
No person shall sell, give away, dispose of, exchange or de-
liver, or permit the sale, gift or procuring of any alcoholic liq-
uors, to or for any minor, any person who is mentally incom-
petent, or any person who is physically or mentally incapaci-
tated by the consumption of such liquors.
Sanctions are provided in NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180.05 (Reissue 1974)
as follows:
Any person ... violating any of the provisions of section 53-
180 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, unon convic-
tion thereof, be fined not less than two hundred fifty dollars
nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned in the
county jail for fifteen days or be both so fined and imprisoned.
13. 196 Neb. at 497, 244 N.W.2d at 66.
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part of the bar or tavern operator toward injured third parties.14
The court accepted the traditional common law theory that the
proximate cause was the act of consumption by the purchaser, not
the act of the vendor in selling the liquor. 15 While the court noted
the recent trend toward allowing recovery in situations such as the
one presented in Circo, it expressed its opinion that the issue was
one of public policy which could be better decided by the legislature
than by the courts. 16 The court concluded by expressing its concern
that imposition of a common law cause of action would create un-
certainty. The court noted that this uncertainty would especially
be prevalent in cases involving social gatherings or "bar hopping"
excursions, and in deciding what standard of care should be ap-
plied.17 As will be discussed, the fears and considerations which
were found by the Nebraska Supreme Court to be obstacles to im-
posing liability, where none had been recognized before, have led
other courts to reexamine the traditional rules in light of present
day needs and theories of law. This reexamination has led some
courts to change the traditional rule to reflect a more realistic atti-
tude.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Theories Used to Modify the Traditional Approach
The common law as it has been interpreted in recent opinions
imposes liability under two closely related theories. The first
theory is that a duty is imposed upon persons by a criminal statute
which provides that no person shall sell or give away alcoholic
liquor to a minor or intoxicated person, and that a violation
of this duty is the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff. This
theory will be referred to as the first modified common law theory.
The second theory is that a duty is imposed on every person not
to do an act the consequences of which are foreseeable, and which
results in harm to another.' 8 This theory will be referred to as
the second modified common law theory.
1. The First Modified Common Law Theory
The basis of the first modified common law theory is that there
is a duty.19 This duty arises when the court adopts the criminal
14. Id. at 499, 244 N.W.2d at 67.
15. Id. at 501, 244 N.W.2d at 68.
16. Id. at 505, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
17. Id. at 504-05, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
18. Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 917, 541 P.2d 365, 369 (1975). See
also Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 413, 187 N.E.2d 292, 296
(1963).
19. Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 759 (D. Alaska 1973).
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statute as defining a minimum standard of care. Violation of the
statute is then evidence of negligence, provided the court views at
least one of the purposes of the statute to be the protection of in-
jured third party victims from conduct proscribed by the statute.20
Thus, where there is a criminal statute prohibiting the serving of
alcoholic liquor, which is intended to protect a class of persons of
which the injured party is a member, the serving of such liquor
is negligence per se. The statute sets a minimum standard of care,
which, when breached, results in a finding of negligence per se.
21
It is the illegal sale which violates this duty to the consumer or
third party. The sale, not the consumption, becomes the proximate
cause of the resulting injury.22 Under this view, it has been held
that contributory negligence is not a defense.
23
At least one court has viewed the rule that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense as being equivalent to strict liability.2 4 The
court in, Vance v. United States25 pointed out that a contributory
negligence defense would be inappropriate because such statutes are
intended to place the entire responsibility for the resulting harm
upon the violator. The court noted that it would be virtually im-
possible for the statute to be violated without contributory negli-
gence on the part of plaintiff-consumer. 26  A concurring opinion
in Meade v. Freeman. 7 stated that there can be no contributory
negligence charged against an innocent third party injured by the
intoxicated person.
28
In order to gain the piotection of the statute, it is necessary
that the person seeking recovery be a member of the class which
the statute seeks to protect.29 It is generally accepted by the cases
20. [A] n unexcused violation of a statute or regulation is negli-
gence in itself if the court adopts the statute as defining the
conduct of a reasonable man.... The court may and usually
must adopt the statute as the minimum standard of care if the
purpose of the statute is at least in part: (a) to protect a class
of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded,
and (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded,
and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm
which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against
the particular hazard from which the harm results.
Id.
21. Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., 259 Or. 583, 586, 488 P.2d 436, 438
(1971).
22. Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 665, 393 S.W.2d 755, 759 (1964).
23. Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. at 759.
24. Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 917, 541 P.2d 365, 370 (1975).
25. 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973).
26. Id. at 759.
27. 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969).
28. Id. at 399, 462 P.2d at 64 (concurring opinion).
29. Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. at 759.
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adopting the first modified common law approach that statutes
such as the one in force in Nebraska are for the protection of the
public in general 0 or for the protection of those persons who may
potentially be harmed if the statute is violated.31 Cases decided
under the traditional common law view take the narrower attitude
that the statute was enacted to regulate sales, or, more broadly,
that it protects those persons to whom the sale of liquor is pro-
hibited by the statute.32  By basing liability on breach of a duty,
some courts have circumvented the traditional common law view
that it is the consumption of the liquor, not the sale, which is the
proximate cause of the injury.
33
2. The Second Modified Common Law Theory
Although several courts have applied the first modified common
law theory, more frequently courts have not been so concerned
with "getting around" the traditional concept of proximate cause.
These courts have instead focused their attention on the foresee-
ability of the resulting harm. This is the approach suggested by
the second modified common law theory. 34 As one court stated:
30. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir.
1959); Veseley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 623, 631 (1971); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 500,
233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156
A.2d 1, 8 (1959).
31. Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262, 263 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Meade
v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 394, 462 P.2d 54, 59 (1969); Thaut v. Finley,
50 Mich. App. 611, 613, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Majors v. Brodhead
Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 268, 205 A.2d 873, 875 (1966).
32. Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 289, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945); Carr
v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 890, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1965); Lee v. Peerless
Inv. Co., 248 La. 982, 991, 183 So. 2d 328, 331 (1966).
33. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955) and its California
antecedents approach the initial adjudication of negligence through the
obsolete gateway of proximate cause rather than duty. Thus these
cases may be unreliable and ripe for qualification or disapproval.
Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 691-94, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 792, 794-96 (1967).
For cases basing liability on a breach of duty, see Marusa v. Dist.
of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Waynick v. Chicago's Last
Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); Vance v. United States, 355
F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 541
P.2d 365 (1975); Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d
436 (1971); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1971); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208
(1964), rev'd 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Berkeley v. Park, 47
Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965).
34. See text accompanying note 16, supra. For cases based primarily on
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Insofar as proximate cause is concerned, we find no basis for a dis-
tinction founded solely on the fact that the consumption of an al-
coholic beverage is a voluntary act of the consumer and is a link
in the chain of causation from the furnishing of the beverage to
the injury resulting from intoxication. Under the above principles
of proximate cause, it is clear that the furnishing of an alcoholic
beverage to an intoxicated person may be a proximate cause of in-
juries inflicted by that individual upon a third person. If such fur-
nishing is a proximate cause, it is so because the consumption, re-
sulting intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are foreseeable
intervening causes, or at least the injury-producing conduct ... is
one of the hazards which makes such furnishing negligent.35
Thus, some courts are no longer willing to refuse recovery on
the basis of technicalities. They are taking into account the
present state of our society instead of blindly following rules
set down years ago. This view was emphasized in Deeds v. United
States,36 where it was noted that travel by automobile to and from
the tavern is so commonplace and that accidents resulting from
drinking are so frequent, that the risk of harm resulting from a
sale of liquor to a minor or intoxicated person can be readily recog-
nized and foreseen.37  The courts that apply the second modified
common law theory have not been willing to insulate liquor vendors
from liability merely because of intervening factors. This is especi-
ally true when the intervening factors and the possibility of injury
resulting from the unlawful sale are reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the sale:
There may be any number of causes and effects intervening be-
tween the first wrongful act and the final injurious occurrence and
if they are such as might, with reasonable diligence, have been
foreseen, the last result as well as the first, and every intermediate
this theory, see Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont.
1969); Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Elder v.
Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d
626 (Ky. 1968); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d
18 (1968); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973);
Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416
Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656,
393 S.W.2d 755 (1964).
35. Veseley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 153, 164, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623,
631 (1971). Other opinions have not been so tactful in their considera-
tion of the traditional common law rule of proximate cause: "Some
courts cling steadfastly to the myth that it is the drinking and not
the sale that is the proximate cause of the ensuing injury and are
wearing blinders when it comes to observing the ordinary course of
human events." Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 399, 462 P.2d 54,
64 (1969) (concurring opinion).
36. 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969).
37. Id. at 355.
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result, is to be considered in law as the proximate result of the
first wrongful cause. A tort-feasor is not relieved from liability
for his negligence by the intervention of the acts of thirds, including
the act of a child, if those acts were reasonably foreseeable. The
theory being that the original negligence continues and operates
contemporaneously with an intervening act which might reason-
ably have been anticipated so that the negligence can be regarded
as a concurrent cause of the injury inflicted. One who negligently-
creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural
and probable consequences thereof although the act of a third per-
son may have contributed to the final result. The law of negli-
gence recognizes that there may be two or more concurrent and
directly cooperative and efficient proximate causes of an injury.38
It is apparent from these and other decisions based on the same
theories39 that many courts have been willing to reexamine the
logic of the traditional common law approach and have found that
it is out of step with current notions of fairness and responsibility.
B. The Nebraska Supreme Court's Response
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court implied its approval of
the traditional common law theory of proximate cause,40 it appar-
ently considered only the first modified common law theory of li-
ability4 ' in reaching its decision in Holmes. The court concluded
that "section 53-180, R.R.S. 1943, does not create a duty toward third
parties, and, as such, the statute does not fix a standard of care,
the violation of which could be proof of negligence in actions by
third parties. To rule otherwise would thwart the intention of the
Legislature. '4 2 The supreme court apparently did not consider the
plaintiffs in this action to be in the class intehided to be protected
by the legislation. 43 Instead, the court stated that the purpose of
the statute was to prohibit the dispensing of liquor to certain per-
sons, and to regulate the manufacture, sale, and distribution of al-
coholic beverages.44 It refused to find that either a civil remedy
38. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 204-05, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959) (citing
from Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4 N.J. 428, 441-42, 73 A.2d 183, 189
(1950)).
39. See notes 33-34 supra.
40. Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 501, 244 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1976).
41. See text accompanying notes 19-33, supra.
42. 196 Neb. at 504, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
43. Id. at 499, 244 N.W.2d at 67.
44. The present law prohibits the dispensing of intoxicating
liquors to certain classes of persons, and is a comprehensive
act to regulate the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
alcoholic liquors.
There are cases from other jurisdictions holding that the
purpose of a prohibitory statute such as the above is to regu-
late the business of selling intoxicants, and not to enlarge civil
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or a duty was created by the statute.45
By taking this narrow. stand, the court ignored the second and
more prevalent modified common law theory of liability, and the
rationale upon which it was based. Instead, it simply disposed of
the matter by stating that the ultimate decision of whether to im-
pose a civil duty on the tavern owner because of a statute drawn
to protect the public by preventing the sale of liquor to those in-
toxicated or under age is clearly a question of policy. 4 6 The court
stated:
We are mindful of the misery caused by drunken drivers and the
losses sustained by both individuals and society at the hands of
drunken drivers, but the task of limiting and defining a new cause
of action which could grow from a fact nucleus formed from any
combination of numerous permutations of the fact situation before
us is properly within the realm of the Legislature.
47
C. A Question for the Legislature or for the Courts?
While the Nebraska Supreme Court is not alone in its feeling
that the legislature should adopt a cause of action,48 several courts
have pointed out that a failure of the legislature to act is not fatal
to finding such a cause of action.49 These courts have found the
common law to be a flexible instrument which may be used to make
the changes necessary to keep the law in step with the times, rather
than an unchanging hinderance to progress.50
remedies .... We agree that statutes of this type do not cre-
ate a civil remedy or impose a duty on the part of the bar
or tavern operator toward injured third parties.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 504, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
47. Id.
48. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 890-91; 385 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1965); Hall
v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 595, 417 P.2d 71, 74 (1966).
49. See Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 -Mass. 498, 500, 233 N.E.2d 18,
19 (1968); Benevolent Protective Order of Elks Lodge #97 v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 324, 326, 266 A.2d 846, 847 (1970); Ramsey v. Anctil,
106 N.H. 375, 376, 211 A.2d at 900, 901 (1965).
50. Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which
allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet changing needs
within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly under-
stood, was not static and did not forever prevent the courts
from reversing themselves or from applying principles of com-
mon law to new situations as the need arose. If this were not
so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should let others
'long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he
lives, do his thinking for him.'
Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 112, 213 N.W.2d 618, 624 (1973) (cit-
ing from Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110
(1961)).
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In making their decisions as to whether or not the common law
should be changed, the courts of other jurisdictions have taken into
account: (1) the high number of accidents caused by drunken driv-
ers,51 (2) the fact that someone saddled with the risk of liability
would have a better opportunity to anticipate and prevent harm,
52
(3) the burden which such potential liability would place on liquor
vendors,53 and (4) the possibility that the courts would be flooded
by unwarranted litigation.5 4 At least one court has considered the
attitude of society toward liquor in reaching its decision:
We are convinced that [courts which have modified the common
law] are basically unable to disenthrall themselves of the lurking
suspicion that liquor in and of itself is evil. This, in spite of the
fact that the legislature here, as in almost every other state, has
determined as public policy that liquor is part and parcel of our
social scene. Abused it may be; evils it may produce; accidents,
injury and death it may cause; marriages and homes it may rup-
ture; unemployment, insolvency and degradation may result from
its over use-but legitimate the selling and consuming of it is de-
clared.55
In Rappaport, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed its opinion
that a finding of such common law liability would afford a fairer
measure of justice to innocent third parties and strengthen and
give greater force to the enlightened statutory and regulatory
51. Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 501, 233 N.E.2d 18, 20
(1968); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 665-66, 393 S.W.2d 755,
759 (1964).
52. Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d 358, 359
(1969) (it is best to place liability on one who can anticipate potential
injury). Cf. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970)
(rejected argument that liquor vendors should be held liable because
they can best anticipate possible harm).
53. Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. at 101, 450 P.2d at 359
(imposing liability would subject tavern owners to ruinous exposure
every time they pour a drink); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724,
730, 176 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1970) (concerned with the difficulty in de-
termining where to cut off the line of liability).
54. We obviously do not accept the "too much work to do" ration-
ale. We place the responsibility exactly where it should be:
not in denying a relief to those who have been injured but on
the judicial machinery of the Commonwealth to fulfill its ob-
ligation to make itself available to litigants. Who is to say
which class of aggrieved plaintiffs should be denied access to
our courts because of speculation that the work load will be
a burden?
Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 250, 310 A.2d 75, 81 (1973) (dissenting
opinion) (emphasis iri the original) (citing from Ayala v. Philadelphia
Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 595, 305 A.2d 877, 882 (1973)).
This attitude was adopted by the court in Brattain v. Herron, 309
N.E.2d 150, 157 (Ind. App. 1974).
55. Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 395, 462 P.2d 54, 60 (1969),
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precautions against such sales and their frightening consequences.5
While the Nebraska Supreme Court was reluctant to consider
the factors enumerated above, it did express its concern that
imposing a common law duty of care would create uncertainty
as to whether or not hosts of social gatherings should be held liable.
The court also expressed concern on the question of how liability
should be distributed among owners of various bars visited on
"bar hopping" excursions, if a common law cause of action were
recognized.
57
D. Liability of Social Hosts
In defining the liability of liquor vendors to "barhoppers" and
persons injured by them, the Nebraska Supreme Court has at its
disposal a great number of cases, which set forth theories of proxi-
mate cause, foreseeability, and intervening causes.5s
In recent years, several courts have considered the liability of
social hosts to injured third persons. 59 The most recent case to
be decided on the subject is Linn v. Rand.30 In Linn, the plaintiff-
pedestrian charged Nacnodovitz, Rand's host, with negligently
serving excess amounts of alcoholic beverages to Rand while a guest
in his home. Nacnodovitz then permitted Rand to drive his car.
Rand proceeded to run into the plaintiff and serious injuries
resulted. In imposing liability, the court stated that "[i]t makes
little sense to say that the licensee ... is under a duty to exercise
care, but give immunity to a social host who may be guilty of the
56. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 205, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959).
57. Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. at 504-05, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
58. See text accompanying notes 18-38 supra.
59. For those cases imposing liability, see Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F.
Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (fraternity party); Brockett v. Kitchen
Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972) (com-
pany Christmas party); Brattain v. Herron, 309 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. App.
1974) (drinking in a private home); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App.
611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973) (wedding reception); Linn v. Rand, 140
N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976) (liquor served to a minor in a
private home).
For those cases denying liability, see Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn,
Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (1972) (club dinner meeting);
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258
Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (fraternity party) (the court- rejected the
argument that a host can never be held liable); Manning v. Andy, 454
Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (party by employer); Halvorson v. Birch-
field Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969) (company
Christmas party); Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255
(1974) (drinking in private home).
00. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
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same wrongful conduct merely because he is unlicensed."6 1 The
court further stated that its goal was to do substantial justice in
light of the mores and needs of modern day life.
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Of special interest is Brattain v. Herron.68 In Brattain, the de-
fendant allowed her minor brother and his friend to drink beer
and whiskey at her home knowing that they would later be driving.
In holding defendant liable, the court noted that the criminal stat-
ute on which they based their decision referred to "any person."
Such statutory reference was found to be broad enough to include
a social host under the modified common law approach.6 4  The
Nebraska statute uses the phrase "no person" rather than "no com-
mercial vendor." Under the reasoning of Brattain, the Nebraska
statute could be read broadly to include social hosts.
The imposition of liability on social hosts is not without opposi-
tion. The court in Hulse v. Driver6 5 refused to extend liability to
persons engaged in a social activity. Instead, the court restricted
liability to those engaged in the commercial furnishing of liquor.
It is therefore clear that should the controversy ever arise, the
Nebraska Supreme Court would not be without precedent on either
side of the issue. In any event, fears of a potential controversy
arising should not serve to hinder the court in deciding the case
at hand.
IV. CONCLUSION
The position of the Nebraska Supreme Court can properly be
described as a "back-eddy running counter to the mainstream of
modern tort doctrine."'6 6 Even though nineteen jurisdictions now
recognize the validity of a common law cause of action against
liquor vendors,6 7 and even though sixteen states have recognized
the need for such a cause of action by enacting dram shop and civil
damage acts,6 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court has refused to act. In-
stead, it has preferred to let the legislature make the decision.
61. Id. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
62. Id. at 218, 356 A.2d at 18-19.
63. 309 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. App. 1974).
64. Id. at 156.
65. 11 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1975).
66. Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 691, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 792, 794 (1967).
67. See notes 9-10 supra.
68. See note 1 supra. fllinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Ore-
gon recognize both a common law and a statutory cause of action.
Therefore, a total of 30 states allow an action to be maintained against
liquor vendors for damages caused by their unlawful sales of alcoholic
beverages.
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The court has ignored the reasoning offered by other courts in
their attempts to adjust legal principles to reflect the current needs
and values of our society. It has been persuaded to rest its deci-
sion on a common law rule made when the needs of the country
and the presence of danger from the violation of such criminal
statutes were much different from the needs and dangers facing
society today. The court has allowed fears of future potential liti-
gation, which other courts have already successfully dealt with, to
prevent a needed remedy in the present litigation. Such inaction
is surely an unwarranted gift to liquor vendors and a hardship on
those who are harmed by the actions of those who now stand
protected.
Avis R. Andrews '78

